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Sovereign debt default can have significant economic, social, and reputational costs. For this 
reason, policy makers across the globe are constantly trying to balance fiscal policy and economic 
growth. Many of them, however, are still unable to do so and fall into sovereign debt default. This 
research paper looks at 52 sample countries from 1980 to 2018 and examines whether sovereign 
debt default can be explained by the gap between GDP growth and interest rates and/or debt-to-
GDP levels. Through a series of empirical analysis, I find that if GDP growth is higher than interest 
rates, risk of default is typically reduced in sample countries. Moreover, I also find that increases 
in debt to GDP are positively correlated to risk of default.  
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Public debt has become a topic of increased interest among policy makers, particularly as its levels 
continue to raise across the world. There is a widespread notion that governments debt levels are 
too high and should be urgently decreased (Blanchard; 2018).  In the U.S., for instance, the ratio 
of Debt to GDP has increased from 93% in 1995 to 136% in 20151. Similarly, in many emerging 
markets, public debt has accumulated to levels last seen during the 1980s debt crisis. Research 
suggests that emerging and developing economies, unlike developed markets, have less debt 
tolerance and can have decreased growth output as levels of debt to GDP increase (Reinhardt and 
Rogoff; 2011). Most recently, given the COVID-19 pandemic, many governments have 
accelerated their debt-to-GDP ratios with the goal of injecting liquidity to their economies and 
minimizing the effects of their economic shutdowns. For example, the U.S. increased government 
debt by $2.42 Trillion during the COVID-19 pandemic to alleviate the economic costs to businesses 
and individuals through “The Cares Act”3. At the same time, the Fed lowered interest rates in 
March 2020 to near zero percent in an effort to provide liquidity to the economy and minimize 
effects of the coronavirus disruption.4 Meanwhile, for many emerging and developing countries 
who were already experiencing high levels of debt-to GDP ratios, fiscal deficits and low economic 
growth, the COVID-19 pandemic has magnified an already unsustainable debt and interest rate 
trajectory. As a result, 66 countries have received ~$23 Billion in Emergency Financing from the 
IMF5 in the past 2-3 months.  
 
High debt levels, however, are not necessarily an issue when real interest rates are low and funds 
are invested in public goods and productive capacity. To this effect, theoretical research suggests 
that countries that have a higher GDP growth vs. interest rates (hereafter growth to interest rate 
 
1 OECD Data: https://data.oecd.org/gga/general-government-debt.htm 
2 About 10% of total US GDP for 2019.  
3 Cares Act Info: https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/cares 
4 The Fed announced 1% point interest rate cut in Mid-march 2020. See figure 1 in Appendix for effect of 
GDP declined growth and interest rates.   
5 IMF’s Financing and Debt Relief program has the goal to alleviate the effects of coronavirus in less 
developed economies.  https://www.imf.org/en/Topics/imf-and-covid19/COVID-Lending-Tracker 
gap”6), should be able to rollover their debt, meaning that the issuance of new debt might not need 
a later increase in taxes (Blanchard, 2018), allowing countries to reduce their debt to GDP ratios 
and the risk of default. In essence, countries like the US, Japan, Great Britain and other advanced 
economies can continue issuing debt at a zero fiscal cost because, for the most part, they have a 
positive “growth to interest rate gap”. Under this premise, economists like Blanchard have even 
proposed lifting current debt-to-GDP caps in the EU, where the cost of borrowing is low and debt 
can be rolled over without tax increases. 
 
On the other hand, in less developed economies, where rates are high and GDP growth is weak, 
high levels of debt can lead to increased borrowing costs and higher debt to GDP ratios, thereby 
increasing the probability of default. Most recently, in 2018, Barbados defaulted on its sovereign 
debt when its debt-to-GDP ratio reached 160%7. Soon after this default, the IMF Executive Board 
approved a four-year extended arrangement under the Extended Fund Facility (EFF) to support 
Barbados’ stabilization program. Although, this agreement has helped Barbados improve their 
S&P credit rating from SD8 to B-, their GDP declined 0.1% in 2019 as their economy continues to 
struggle.9 Ultimately, the costs resulting from a debt crisis can be long, persistent, and hard to 
overcome. In my sample countries, for instance, it was found that defaulting countries stayed in 
default10 for an average of 8 years11 and in various instances a sovereign debt default was followed 
by a banking crises. Although this paper does not empirically analyze banking crises, it is 
important to understand the feedback loop that exists between a sovereign debt default and banking 
crises. (Reinhardt & Rogoff; 2011).  Once a banking crisis explodes, this can have several negative 
consequences to an economy through credit shrinking and social unrest.12   Moreover, Thakor 
suggests that there is a correlation between high leverage financial institutions and consumer 
leverage which increases fragilities of the financial system (Goel, Song and Thakor; 2013). These 
 
6 Gap is defined as GDP growth- Interest rates.  
7 Barbados IMF Country Report 2019.  
8 SD is defined as selective default by S&P 500. A country in SD does not get a rating.  
9 IMF database https://www.imf.org/en/Countries/BRB 
10 Default defined by Reinhardt’s database, which means countries stay in default for local and/or foreign 
markets.  
11 Full list of defaults per country in Figure 1 
12 Most recently Lebanon’s sovereign default has also caused a banking crises with significant social 
unrest. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/mar/07/lebanon-to-default-on-debt-for-first-time-amid-
financial-crisis 
fragilities in an event of sovereign debt default are only magnified given the fact that in many cases 
local banks are holders of public debt.  For example, during the early 2010s European debt crises, 
reports of debt sustainability by some European countries (e.g. Greece, Spain, Portugal) caused 
financial turmoil to European banks exposed with debt from these nations (Gennaioli, Martinim 
Rossi; 2014). Most recently, Lebanon defaulted on their sovereign debt in early 2020 (pre-
COVID), and it has caused banks to set limits to cash withdrawal13 and shrink credit. The case of 
Lebanon is consistent with Sosa-Padilla’s (2012) argument that “When these bankers are highly 
exposed to government debt a default triggers a banking crisis which leads to a corporate credit 
collapse and consequently to an output decline” 
 
From an empirical standpoint, significant research has been done around levels of debt to GDP 
and its effects on economic growth. For instance, when debt to GDP reaches 90%, countries start 
experiencing a 1% decline in economic growth (Reinhart et al; 2010). Similarly, countries that 
experience persistent increases of Debt to GDP have lower output growth resulting from a 
“crowding out effect” and a “loss of confidence”. Additionally, the more the government spends, 
the less the private sector does and as levels of debt to GDP increase, investors demand higher 
premiums, which can make debt self-fulfilling (Chudik et al; 2018). Significant research has also 
been done in the area of debt restructuring and its effects in economic growth and sovereign 
reputation (Forni et al; 2017). This paper contributes to existing research and literature by helping 
improve our understanding of historical default and our ability to predict probability of default by 
empirically testing the impact of “nominal GDP growth - nominal interest rate gap” as well as 
“debt to GDP” ratios. Like Blanchard, I use nominal GDP and interest rates in my sample countries 
in order to take into account inflation, given the fact, that most debt instruments as well as 
government taxes are calculated in nominal rates14.. For these reasons, in order to more accurately 
measure the dynamics of “debt rollover”15  I made both variables nominal in my calculations16 . 
As previously stated, this paper tests Blanchard’s as well as Reinhardt & Rogoff’s arguments, not 
only by analyzing actual historical defaults but also probability of default per S&P ratings across 
 
13 https://internationalbanker.com/finance/what-is-behind-lebanons-deepening-financial-crisis/ 
14 Only 15% of all US debt is issued in TIPS (Treasury Inflation Protected Securities). Tax systems 
calculate taxes in nominal terms: https://www.economics.utoronto.ca/jfloyd/modules/uinf.html 
15 Debt rollover is defined as the ability of a government to reduce debt ratios over time. In principle if 
nominal GDP growth is higher than nominal interest rates, debt should rollover time.  
16 Inflation was added to GDP real growth rates. Money market interest rates already include inflation.  
a sample group of advanced, emerging and Latin American economies.  Ultimately, this paper 
seeks to better understand what makes emerging and Latin American (hereafter Latam) countries 
more susceptible to a default than advanced economies? How did these economies behave the year 
of default or five years before a default? Can emerging and Latam countries also benefit from 
positive “GDP growth to interest rate gap”? How does the “GDP growth to interest rate gap” 
compare vs. increases in Debt to GDP at a regional level?  
 
In an attempt to answer the above questions, this paper starts by analyzing existing theory around 
debt and the factors that may contribute to a default event, including high debt to GDP ratios and/or 
a negative “GDP growth to interest rate” gap (Section 2). Section 3 of this paper includes a 
description of data and summary statistics, Section 4 covers my empirical results, and Section 5 
concludes this paper. 
 
2 Theory and Literature Review 
As previously stated, significant research has been done around the topic of debt and economic 
growth as well episodes of sovereign debt default.  Most recently, significant attention has been 
placed in advanced economies where levels of debt to GDP have consistently been rising since the 
2008 crises. This paper analyses two different theories around debt – those who argue that debt 
doesn’t matter for countries where the cost of borrowing is low and debt can be rollover and those 
who argue that debt matters because it can hinder economic growth.  
 
In his paper “Public Debt and Low Interest Rates,” Oliver Blanchard argues that as long as the 
interest rate remains lower than the growth rate, the ratio of debt to GDP decreases overtime and 
higher debt may not result in a fiscal cost or higher taxes (Blanchard, 2018). Blanchard attempts 
to prove his argument not only through theory, but also by looking at historical data on interest 
rates and GDP growth rates in the U.S. where, he claims, a positive GDP growth gap (g > r) has 
been the standard rather than the exception.  
 
A similar theory about debt rollover was proposed by Michael Woodford in 1990. Woodford claims 
that an increase in public debt can be rolled over forever without taxes ever having to be increased. 
This paper suggests that debt rollover could be a realistic possibility in countries like the U.S., 
where the real rate of return on Treasury bills over the postwar period has been close to zero, while 
the average real GDP growth rate has been consistently over 3% per year (Woodford;1990).  
 
Similarly, Summers (2019) also points out that given the low interest rates in advanced economies, 
politicians and policy makers should focus more on worthwhile investments in healthcare, 
education, and infrastructure rather than cutting deficits. His research claims that even though the 
current national debt of the U.S. represents a far larger percentage of GDP than in recent decades, 
the U.S. government currently pays around the same proportion of GDP in interest on its debt, 
adjusted for inflation, as it has on average since World War II.  
 
Meanwhile, in their paper, ‘A self-fulfilling model of Mexico's 1994–1995 debt crisis’, Cole and 
Kehoe’s prove that debt rollover is not always possible in countries like Mexico where g > r is not 
the norm. In their paper, they explain how the Bank of Mexico found it difficult to rollover 
Mexico’s government debt in the weekly bond auctions during December 1994 and January 1995 
and explore the extent to which this phenomenon can be explained using their model of self-
fulfilling debt crises. In other words, investors feared that Mexico would be unable to honor its 
commitments on bonds, which made them unwilling to purchase new bonds. Unable to sell new 
bonds or restructure debt, Mexico was forced into a position of default (Cole and Kehoe 1995)17. 
To this effect, Cole’s and Kehor’s paper relates to the theory of “multiple equilibria”, which holds 
that if investors believe debt to be safe, then they will hold it at a safe rate. In this case, the fiscal 
cost of debt may be zero (like in the U.S.) but if investors believe that debt is risky and ask for a 
risk premium, debt payments will be larger, debt will indeed be riskier, and investors’ expectations 
may be self-fulfilling (Blanchard; 2018).  
Budget constrained18 policy makers usually face a tradeoff analysis between sovereign debt default 
or austerity plans. Austerity plans helps governments funnel revenue to debt repayments, however 
the social and economic costs of austerity can also incentivize countries to default, therefore fiscal 
forward guidance can help nations reduce cost of debt while decreasing expenses and increasing 
revenue in the medium term (Bianchi et al; 2019). In this sense, similarly to corporate budgeting, 
 
17 Cole and Kehoe 604 citations Journal of International Economics 
18 Defined as governments with little room for counter cyclical fiscal policy.  
policy makers should invest in projects with positive NPV and/or IRR. For example, if cost of debt 
for emerging markets is between 6% to 8%, policy makers should aim to invest in projects with 
IRR> 8%.  One mechanism that can help policy makers achieve debt sustainability is by issuing 
“growth index bonds” (Blanchard; 2016). With this type of bond instrument, emerging markets in 
particular, could lower costs of debt in recession cycles and increase interest rate to investor during 
boom cycles.  
 
Reinhart and Ragoff ‘s (2010) argue that debt thresholds matter  because countries with a debt to 
GDP ratio higher than 90% experience roughly 1% lower GDP growth rates, which in turn can 
increase risk of default by increasing debt servicing costs and lower fiscal revenue. Lastly, 
according to Reinhart, the relationship between public debt and economic growth is remarkably 
similar across emerging markets and advanced economies.  
 
Although there is substantial research on the dynamics of debt- to- GDP and GDP growth to 
interest rates (debt rollover), most papers are focused on advanced economies and none of them 
combine both theories when trying to understand sovereign debt default. In an effort to contribute 
to existing theories/research on the topic of debt, this research paper empirically tests both – 
whether a positive “GDP growth to interest rate gap” reduces the risk of default and whether a 
higher debt to GDP ratio indeed increases probability of default by hindering economic growth. 
Lastly, instead of focusing on one or two countries as case studies, this paper looks at a sample of 
52 countries to determine if the above theories apply across the board, thereby helping explain 
historical defaults and probability of default per S&P ratings.  
3 Data and Research Method 
This paper looks at data from 1980 to 2018 for 52 sample countries, which are broken down into 
three groups: (1) Advanced economies19, (2) Emerging countries, and (3) Latam countries only. 
During this timeframe, seventeen nations within the sample experienced at least one default event 
and 58%20 of those occurred in the Latin American region. Seven nations in the emerging market 
group experienced at least one event of default, while none of the advanced economies experienced 
 
19 Defined per IMF classification of advanced economies.  
20 Please see Figure XX for count of countries with >1 default.  
a default during this time frame. Historical defaults were pulled from Carmen’s Reinhart data-
website and confirmed in Harvard’s “Global Crises Data” database.   Probability of defaults  are 
extrapolated from Standard & Poor´s Foreign Currency Long-Term Ratings, and the Sovereign 
Cumulative Average Default Rate (1975 - 2017)  obtained from the 2018 Annual Sovereign 
Default Study and Rating Transitions published by S&P Global. GDP growth, inflation and interest 
rates (money market rates) are obtained from standard sources provided by Thomson Reuters 
Eikon, and Debt-to-GDP ratios are obtained from the historical World Economic Outlook reports.  
 
In order to test the two main theories around debt mentioned in the literature review section, I set 
up two main hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 1 (H1): Does a positive “GDP growth to interest rate gap” reduce risk of default 
through debt rollover?  
Hypothesis 2 (H2): Does debt to GDP increase probability of default by hindering economic 
growth? 
 
To test these hypotheses, I took two different approaches. In the first approach, I used actual 
defaults21 and ran lagged variable regressions at year of default all the way up until 5 years before 
a historical default. To accomplish this, a dummy variable indicating the presence (“1”) or absence 
(“0”) of a default event (domestic or foreign) was used as the dependent variable. This approach 
helped identify what factors contributed to a default before the actual year of default. From an 
independent variable perspective, I applied Blanchard’s “GDP growth to interest rate gap” formula 
and added inflation rates to GDP in order to calculate the “gap.”22 Interest rates in nominal rates 
were obtained from Thomson Reuters Eikon, and although Blanchard uses US government T-Bill 
interest rates, given that the same data was not available for all of my sample countries, I used 
money market interest rates in local currency. T-Bills influence money market’s interest rates, and 
therefore can be used as a proxy to measure the “GDP growth to interest rate gap” in these sample 
countries.   My other independent variable is debt- to -GDP ratio.  
 
 
21 Actual defaults are defined as the year when a country defaulted.  
22 “GDP growth – Interest rates” 
In the second approach, rather than using the actual default event (0 or 1), I used the probability of 
default per S&P 2018 Annual Sovereign Default and Rating (1975-2018)23. and regress it to the 
same independent variables24. In this approach, I grouped my sample countries into three separate 
groups: Advanced, Emerging and Latam. Once grouped, I calculated the “probability of default” 
for each group based on their average credit rating25, which I then regressed against my 
independent variables in order to determine change (increase or decrease) in probability of default. 
Please see summary statics section for rating and probability of default per region.  
 
For both approaches, I found that (H1) a 1 percent point positive gap is associated with a decrease 
in the probability of default and (H2) a 1 percent point increase in debt to GDP ratio increases the 
probability of default. These results are significant at an aggregate level (all sample countries) as 
well as by regional and/or grouping26 breakdown. For example, in Emerging Markets, five years 
before a default event, a 1percent point positive gap reduces probability of default by -0.00080 
percent points.  In Latin America the same relationship is observed at 4 years before a default event 
where a 1 percent point positive gap reduces probability of default by -0.00124 percent points. 
Although these results are significant at 5% and 10% respectively, the degree of representation is 
about 20%. In these regards, it is important for policy makers to understand other macroeconomic 
drivers that can help accelerate a default event such as “% of debt in foreign currency” as well as 
health of primary balance (Blanchard, 2019). Reinhart and Raggoff (2010) also suggest that the 
percentage of debt servicing seems to explain default likelihood under various default rates. This 
paper, however, does not test or investigate % of debt in foreign currency nor debt servicing.  
4. Summary Statistics: 
Table 1 report summary statistics of Latam, Emerging and Advanced countries including the 
following variables: Debt to GDP, Interest Rates, Inflation Rate, GDP Growth, # of Historical 
Defaults , S&P Probability of Default 15 years and ratings.  Table 2 lists countries per category 
and time ranges (min and max) of data collected during analyzed timeframe. In Latin America, the 
 
23 S&P 2018 Sovereign Ratings. More info here 
24 Please see appendix for variable definition.  
25 See summary statistics per group for average Credit Rating and Probability of Default 
26 There are not “deafult events” in advanced economies during 1988 to 2018. Therefore, approach 1 
does not include empirical analysis for “advanced economies”.  
region with most defaults from my sample we can also notice that it has the highest debt to GDP 
average, Interest Rates27 and Inflation rates. In fact, when applying the gap formula GDP nominal 
– Interest Rates nominal I obtain the following number: 3.13% +135.65% - 397.99% = - 259.21%.  
This result can be explained by the large standard deviation and/or volatility of this market. For 
example, when doing the same analysis as above at 75% percentile we obtain the following value: 
5.71% + 19.94 – 20.71 = 4.94%. The 4th section of Table 1 (“Defaulters”) reports summary 
statistics of countries that had 1+ defaults.  Interestingly debt to GDP at the 50% percentile in 
Defaulters group is 48% while in Latam and Emerging markets is 42%. This difference suggests 
that countries that did default, usually have a higher Debt to GDP ratio than those that did not.  
The ratings, per S&P 500 were collected at a country level and were later grouped based on the 
mode28 and the average rating for Latam, Emerging and Advanced countries is at follows: B, BBB 
and AA.  According to these ratings, the median default probability per S&P 500 for LATAM 
countries in a 15-year period is 30.21%, Emerging 8.51% and Advanced 0.21%. 
5. Empirical Results 




For approach I, I begin testing hypothesis (I) in order to measure “GDP growth to interest rate 
gap” in historical defaults, data was winsorized in order to minimize effects of outliers. In then 
add “Debt to GDP”  to my panel regression in order to test hypothesis (II) and horse race29 them 
against in each other . My dependent variable is historical default at time t. In essence, if there was 
a default in a given year my dependent variable is “1” while “0” is there was no default.  I use a 
lagged regression in this approach in order to get a better understanding the effects of “growth to 
interest rate gap” and “debt to GDP” before an actual default.  I add country fixed effects to my 
regressions in both approaches in order to control for unobservable30 variables in sample countries.  
 
27 See Figure XX for interest rate trend for Latin American Nations 
28 Most common rating for all countries in the region.  
29 Defined as comparing the effect of these variables side by side.  
30 Unobservable variables could be political risk, ease of doing business in country and any other factors 
that are not captured in my data and that vary between nations.  
 
Please see below regression for approach I: 
 
𝐻𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽1(𝑔𝑖,𝑡−5 +𝜋𝑖,𝑡−5 − 𝑟𝑖,𝑡−5) + 𝛽2𝛾𝑖,𝑡−5 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖,𝑡 
 
It is important to mentioned that during by observation time frames (1980- 2018) there are no 
historical defaults in advanced economies. Therefore, approach 1 only contains regional 
breakdown for Emerging and Latam countries.   
 
For approach II I take a slightly different approach with my panel regression. From an independent 
variable perspective, I use S&P credit rating default probability and my regression looks like this: 
 
𝑆&𝑃𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑜𝑓𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽1(𝑔𝑖,𝑡−5 +𝜋𝑖,𝑡−5 − 𝑟𝑖,𝑡−5) + 𝛽2𝛾𝑖,𝑡−5 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖,𝑡 
 
For this panel regression in addition to using country fixed effects I also add time fixed effects in 
order to control changes through time.  
5.2 Main Regression Results  
Panel A reports lagged explanatory variable results regressed against actual defaults. Here I find 
that at 5 years before a default a 1 percentage point gap increase,  reduces probability of default 
by -0.00091%  and it is significant at 1%. In lagged years 1 and 3 a 1% gap also reduces default 
risk by -0.00143% and -0.00061% with significance levels at 1% and 10% respectively.   For other 
years, although the coefficients are also negative results are not significant.   It is not surprising 
that a 1% gap during the year of a default (Î¸=0) does not reduce risk of default given that given 
that is the year of actual default. In this regression, I also added debt to GDP as my other 
independent variable and found that a1 % increases in debt to GDP increases probability of default 
by 0.00015% at (Î¸=5)  and it is significant at a 1% level. It is also interesting to notice that in this 
panel the gap between GDP-interest rates are inversely correlated to debt to GDP.  Results in Panel 
A show consistency with Blanchard’s theory in regards of how a positive gap can have an effect 
in reducing risk of default.  This regression also shows interesting results about increases in debt 
and their effect in risk of default by demonstrating that a 1% increase in debt can also increase 
probability of default 5 and 2 years before a default and are significant at 5%. Other results are not 
significant; however they all share the same coefficient direction, therefore suggesting that both 
theories can help better explain risk of historical default.    
<Insert Panel A here> 
Panel B reports results at a regional level between Emerging and Latam countries. Since there are 
no historical defaults in advanced economies, there are no results for this region in this panel.  
Emerging markets have a dual impact at year 5 when a 1% gap increase reduces probability of 
default by 0.0008% while a 1% increase in debt increases default by 0.00015% and both results 
are significant at 5%.  Total debt to GDP is also significant at year 2 , while a positive gap is 
significant at year 1. For most years, the coefficients of debt to GDP and GDP growth – interest 
rates are inversely correlated expect of year of default, when they both have a negative coefficient.    
In Latin America results show that the “growth to interest rate gap” is significant at in years 1 to 3 
before a default, while total debt to GDP is significant at 1% in 5 years before a default and a 1% 
increase in debt to GDP ratio can increase probability of default by 0.00014%. 
< Insert Panel B here> 
Panel C shows the results with S&P sovereign rates probability of default as the dependent 
variable. I break down results per region and  Columns (1) to (4) are for Latam results, while (5) 
to (8) Emerging and (9) to (12) Advanced. Results suggest that a 1% increase in Debt to GDP ratio 
causes an increase in probability of default across all regions and it is significant at 1%. Emerging 
economies seem to be the most sensitive to a 1 % increase in Debt to GDP since it increases 
probability of default by 0.12% (See column 8 – Panel C).   From a gap perspective, a 1% 
difference reduces probability of default in all regions, however for advanced economies this 
coefficient is only significant when adding time fixed effect (column 11). Similarly as the results 
found in panel B, we can see that emerging markets are more sensitive to Debt to GDP rations 
than Latam and Advanced. Panel D only looks at “GDP Growth-Interest rates (gap) as the 
independent variable and Panel E only looks at “Total Debt to GDP”.  Columns (4), (8) and (12) 
include country and time fixed effects.  Results show the same trend when independent variables 
are looked individually and significance of results ranges from 1% to 10%  in all columns.  
 
In Panel F, I lagged independent variables and broke down countries in two groups: a) Debt to 
GDP > 90% and b) Debt to GDP < 90%. My goal on doing this is, trying to test the impact of debt 
trajectory as well as debt thresholds.  Reinhardt and Rogoff argue that at 90% debt output starts to 
decline, therefore it can be implied that probability of default should increase.  These results show 
that countries with Debt >90% (mostly advanced economies) can benefit from debt rollover, since 
the gap is significant at 1 % Î¸=1 to Î¸=4  and 10% at  Î¸=5.   These results confirm Blanchard’s 
argument that the gap is able rollover debt and therefore not increase risk of default. On the other 
hand debt trajectory and/or debt thresholds play a more important role in countries with Debt < 
90% and it is significant at 1%.  A 1% gap also reduces probability of default at Î¸=5, however it 
is not significant for the rest of observations.   
<Insert Panel F here> 
6. Conclusion 
This research paper empirically tests both – whether a positive gap “GDP growth to interest rate 
gap” can influences   risk of default and whether a higher debt to GDP ratio increases probability 
of default by hindering economic growth. To do so, instead of focusing on one or two countries as 
case studies, I analyze a sample of 52 countries through two different approaches (historical 
defaults and S&P 500 ratings) in order to determine if the above theories apply across the board. I 
find that there is a significant positive relationship between a 1% increase in gap and decrease in 
risk and probability of default. There is also significant relation between debt to GDP and increased 
probability of default among emerging and Latam countries.  Also when grouping countries by 
debt to GDP thresholds, results demonstrate that countries with high debt to GDP ratio > 90% can 
experience a debt rollover effect (majority of countries with >90% Debt to GDP are advance 
economies), consistent with Blanchard’s debt rollover theory. On the other hand, nations with Debt 
to GDP with less < 90% (mostly emerging and Latam markets) can increase risk of default with 
increases of Debt to GDP.  These results are similar to those found by Ragoff and Reinhart in 
“Debt in Time of Growth” were they demonstrate that emerging markets due to their higher levels 
of foreign debt have reduced economic growth.   My findings can perhaps help us understand why 
nations like Japan can afford to have a debt to GDP ratio of 237%31 without generating any 
concerns about its repayment capacity, therefore keeping cost of borrowing low.  For example, the 
GDP- Interest rates gap for Japan in the past 5 years has average a positive gap of 2.2 percentage 
 
31 Data is obtained in World Bank data as well as Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development.  
points.32Meanwhile, you have a less developed nations like Argentina whose debt to GDP ratio is 
only 86%33 and their GDP growth -Interest rates gap for the past 5 years (pre-COVID)  averaged 
-9.70%. The COVID-19 situation is amplifying risk of default in developing economies34 due to 
negative GDP growth rates, high interest rates among other factors. In this sense, it would not be 
surprising that in the coming months more emerging and developing nations, similar to the path 
taken by Argentina, will enter debt restructuring or debt relief programs in order reduce or 
eliminate short term debt repayments while implementing fiscal forward guidance and/or fiscal 
austerity plans.  
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7. Appendix 
Appendix A lists all variables examined in this paper, description and data sources 
Variable Description Source 
Debt to DGP (%) Total Debt vs. GDP in a given country World Bank  
Interest Rate (%) Money Market Interest rates for deposits. 
This was the best proxy available for all 
sample groups as "T-Bill" interest rates. 
Thomson Reuters Eikon 
Inflation Rate (%) Inflation rates per country in a yearly basis.  Thomson Reuters Eikon 
Real GDP Growth (%) Real GDP growth per country in a yearly 
basis.  
 
Thomson Reuters Eikon 
Gap (GDP growth - Interest 
Rates) 
Difference between GDP growth nominal- 
Interest Rates 
Calculated by Blanchard's method. Explained in 
Public Debt and Low Interest Rates 
Historical Default  Defined as year in which a country entered 
in default 
Carmen Reinhart's database 
Debt threshold  Total amount of Debt to GDP in a given 
year for a country and/or region.  
Reinhart and Ragoff threshold used in "Growth 
in time of Debt" 
S&P 500 probability of default  Sovereign rating per country Annual Sovereign Default and Rating Transition 
Emerging countries Countries that are emerging but not in 
Latam 
World Bank definition of emerging markets 
Latam  Emerging markets from Latam including 
those that data was mostly available 






Table 1: Summary Statistics (1988-2018) 
Table 1 reports summary statistics by subgroup samples. All variables are reported annually, and S&P Rating is determined by identifying the 
mode per region/category.  There are no defaults in advanced economies during the time frame analyzed. Variables are broken down at 25%, 
50% and 75% percentile. Details about variable definitions can be found in Appendix A. Defaulters are countries with 1+ historical default during 
my observation.  
1.1. LATAM 
 N Mean SD p25 p50 p75 
GAP 376 -268.16 5370.36 -3.87 1.80 7.61 
Total Debt To GDP 389 103.53 476.74 29.80 42.32 61.40 
Interest Rate 386 397.99 5536.83 5.60 10.02 20.71 
Inflation Rate 380 135.65 698.34 3.98 8.02 19.94 
GDP Growth 377 3.13 3.69 1.64 3.71 5.17 
Probability Default S&P 300 22.36 17.07 9.45 16.44 30.21 
Average Credit Rating  B 
 
 
2.2  Emerging 
 N Mean SD p25 p50 p75 
GAP 934 -105.02 3407.39 -1.36 2.85 6.93 
Total Debt To GDP 993 69.17 300.38 27.68 42.47 61.40 
Interest Rate 987 162.62 3464.98 4.50 8.17 14.49 
Inflation Rate 972 60.69 441.98 3.01 5.82 11.62 
GDP Growth 939 4.20 4.09 2.40 4.36 6.49 
Probability Default S&P 803 16.64 14.76 8.51 9.45 16.44 







1.3 Advanced  
 
 N Mean SD p25 p50 p75 
GAP 758 0.044 3.199 -1.63 0.26 2.09 
Total Debt To GDP 784 63.21 36.80 39.49 57.50 75.7 
Interest Rate 769 5.54 4.54 2.18 4.52 8.22 
Inflation Rate 782 3.75 5.71 1.44 2.37 4.06 
GDP Growth 764 2.30 2.33 1.20 2.34 3.57 
Probability Default S&P 743 0.94 2.84 0 0 0.21 




1.4 Defaulters  
 N Mean SD p25 p50 p75 
GAP 416 -265.45 5090.72 -3.90 2.36 7.753 
Total Debt To GDP 459 92.43 439.68 27.37 39.3 59.49 
Interest Rate 454 339.48 5106.01 6.23 11.45 24.98 
Inflation Rate 445 96.10 521.12 4.42 8.44 20.63 
GDP Growth 418 3.68 3.95 2 4.34 6.148 












Table 2: This table provides list minimum and maximum years of available data for my sample 
countries.  
LATAM (Min Max) EMERGING (Min MAX) Advanced(Min Max) 
Argentina 1980 2018 China 1981 2018 Australia 1980 2016 
Bolivia 1988 2018 Czech Republic 1993 2018 Austria 1980 2017 
Brazil 1980 2018 Egypt 1988 2018 Belgium 1980 2017 
Chile 1980 2018 Greece 2003 2018 Canada 1980 2017 
Colombia 1988 2018 Hungary 1991 2018 Denmark 1980 2017 
Costa Rica 1997 2018 India 1980 2018 Finland 1980 2017 
Ecuador 1994 2018 Indonesia 1980 2018 France 1980 2017 
El Salvador 1988 2018 Israel 1995 2018 Germany 1980 2017 
Mexico 1980 2018 Korea 1980 2018 Iceland 1980 2017 
Nicaragua 1988 2018 Malasya 1980 2018 Ireland 1980 2017 
Peru 1988 2018 Pakistan 1988 2018 Italy 1980 2017 
Uruguay 1988 2018 Phillipines 1980 2018 Japan 1980 2017 
   Poland 1989 2018 Netherlands 1980 2017 
   Qatar 1997 2018 New Zeland 1980 2018 
   Russia 1990 2018 Norway 1980 2017 
   South Africa 1994 2018 Portugal 1996 2018 
   Taiwan 1980 2018 Spain 1980 2017 
   Thailand 1980 2018 Sweden 1980 2017 
   Turkey 1980 2018 Switzerland 1980 2017 
      UK 1980 2017 























PANEL A: Approach 1 all Regions 
This panel reports results for risk of default (based on historical defaults) for all regions combined with lags of  1 to 5 years.  Country 
fixed effects are included in all lags. Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. * indicates that coefficient is significant at 10%  level, 
** 5% level and *** at 1% level.  
  
 Î¸=0 Î¸=1 Î¸=2 Î¸=3 Î¸=4 Î¸=5 
Gap -0.00003 -0.00143*** -0.00035 -0.00061* -0.00028 -0.00091*** 
 (0.00030) (0.00043) (0.00040) (0.00034) (0.00041) (0.00029) 
Debt to GDP 0.00000 0.00005*** 0.00014*** 0.00002 0.00006*** 0.00015*** 
 (0.00001) (0.00002) (0.00004) (0.00001) (0.00002) (0.00003) 
Observations 1684 1665 1614 1563 1512 1461 
R-squared 0.04096 0.05593 0.06357 0.03574 0.03615 0.06776 











PANEL B: Approach 1 per Region 
This panel reports results for risk of default (based on historical defaults)  for all regions combined with lags of Î= 0 to Î =5  years. Country fixed effects are included. Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. * 




 Î¸=0 Î¸=1 Î¸=2 Î¸=3 Î¸=4 Î¸=5 Î¸=0 Î¸=1 Î¸=2 Î¸=3 Î¸=4 Î¸=5  
Gap -0.00106* -0.00253*** -0.00103** -0.00124* -0.00009 -0.00056** -0.00011 -0.00148** -0.00038 -0.00059 -0.00006 -0.00080*** 
 (0.00048) (0.00072) (0.00045) (0.00058) (0.00036) (0.00021) (0.00037) (0.00054) (0.00047) (0.00047) (0.00043) (0.00025)  
Debt to GDP -0.00006*** -0.00007** 0.00009 0.00001 0.00005* 0.00014*** -0.00001 0.00001 0.00012*** 0.00002 0.00006*** 0.00015*** 
 (0.00002) (0.00003) (0.00006) (0.00001) (0.00002) (0.00004) (0.00002) (0.00003) (0.00004) (0.00001) (0.00002) (0.00003)  
Observations 376 376 364 352 340 328 926 926 896 866 836 806  
R-squared 0.24820 0.29065 0.29874 0.19013 0.16169 0.20954 0.08607 0.09911 0.10852 0.06602 0.06133 0.09114  
























Panel C: Approach 2  All Regions 
 
Panel C is probability of default per S&P ratings related to Growth-Interest rates (gap) variables. Subgroups are divided as Latam, Emerging and Advanced.  Country and 
Time Fixed effects are included in columns 4, 8 and 12. Other columns include one or the other fixed effect.  Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. * indicates that 
coefficient is significant at 10%  level, ** 5% level and *** at 1% level.  
 LATAM Emerging Advanced 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
GAP -0.00073*** -0.00150*** -0.00066 -0.00153*** -0.00125*** -0.00153*** -0.00144*** -0.00153*** -0.00167 0.02778 -0.17507** -0.08084 
 (0.00022) (0.00049) (0.00042) (0.0005) (0.00033) (0.00049) (0.0005) (0.00048) (0.05138) (0.03835) (0.08691) (0.06548) 
Total Debt / 
GDP 
0.20355*** 0.11260*** 0.19357*** 0.08605** 0.17421*** 0.13311*** 0.17095*** 0.12849*** 0.02320*** 0.02643*** 0.01655*** 0.01800*** 
 -0.03725 -0.03765 -0.03895 -0.03785 -0.02003 -0.0309 -0.02048 -0.03196 -0.00436 -0.00488 -0.0037 -0.00481 
Observations 288 288 288 288 744 744 744 744 730 730 730 730 
R-squared 0.15027 0.67382 0.18815 0.71797 0.13901 0.6635 0.15355 0.67774 0.10153 0.5089 0.20401 0.56249 
Time Fixed 
Effects No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Country 











Panel D: Approach 2 per Region  
Panel D is probability of default per  S&P ratings related to Debt to GDP only.   Regional subgroups are divided in Latam, Emerging and Advanced. Country fixed  and Time effects are included 
jointly in columns (4) (8) and (12). Other columns include one or the other fixed effects.  Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. * indicates that coefficient is significant at 10%  level, ** 
5% level and *** at 1% level.  
 LATAM Emerging Developed 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Debt to GDP 0.20208*** 0.11091*** 0.19324*** 0.08652** 0.17485*** 0.15335*** 0.17265*** 0.14870*** 0.02256*** 0.02619*** 0.01707*** 0.01933*** 
 (0.03652) (0.03676) (0.03829) (0.03718) (0.01964) (0.03225) (0.01986) (0.0333) (0.00434) (0.00482) (0.00396) (0.00477) 
Observations 300 300 300 300 803 803 803 803 743 743 743 743 
R-squared 0.14681 0.65722 0.18742 0.70373 0.14234 0.64222 0.15956 0.66011 0.08663 0.55861 0.14699 0.60264 
Time Fixed 
Effects  
No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Country 
Fixed Effects  























PANEL E: Approach 2 
Panel D is probability of default per  S&P ratings related to gap only.   Regional subgroups are divided in Latam, Emerging and Advanced. Country fixed  and Time effects are included jointly in 
columns (4) (8) and (12). Other columns include one or the other fixed effects.  Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. * indicates that coefficient is significant at 10%  level, ** 5% level and 
*** at 1% level. 
 LATAM (1-4) Emerging (5-8)  Developed (9-12) 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Gap -0.00068*** -0.00133*** -0.00064 -0.00138*** -0.00121*** -0.00133*** -0.00158*** -0.00134*** 0.00179 0.02439 -0.19967** -0.11878* 
 (0.00023) (0.00048) (0.00041) (0.00049) (0.00038) (0.00048) (0.00059) (0.00046) (0.05279) (0.03879 (0.08968) (0.06678) 
 Observations 288 288 288 288 744 744 744 744 730 730 730 730 
R-Squared  0.006 0.646 0.081 0.706 0.011 0.636 0.045 0.654 0.006 0.458 0.169 0.542 
Time Fixed 
Effects  
No  No Yes  Yes No  No Yes Yes No  No Yes Yes 
Country Fixed 
Effects  












Panel F: Approach 2 with Debt Thresholds 
 
Panel C is probability of default related to gap and total debt to GDP. Î indicates years lagged and country fixed effects are included. standard errors are 
reported in parenthesis. * indicates that coefficient is significant at 10%  level, ** 5% level and *** at 1% level.  
 Debt < 90%  Debt  = or > 90%  
 Î¸=0 Î¸=1 Î¸=2 Î¸=3 Î¸=4 Î¸=5 Î¸=0 Î¸=1 Î¸=2 Î¸=3 Î¸=4 Î¸=5 
 
Gap 0.00013 -0.01163 -0.02328 -0.02311 -0.03895 -0.06327* -0.38519*** -0.35946*** -0.89904*** -0.93129*** -0.38436*** -0.17439* 
 
 (0.03651) (0.03764) (0.03780) (0.03484) (0.03350) (0.03432) (0.08269) (0.05994) (0.20666) (0.27266) (0.06305) (0.10060) 
 
Total Debt / 
GDP 0.08832*** 0.08804*** 0.06403*** 0.01814 0.00491 0.00214 -0.03183 -0.00750 -0.03214 -0.02360 -0.04455* -0.06253*** 
 
 (0.01676) (0.01667) (0.02023) (0.01511) (0.00501) (0.00190) (0.03606) (0.02508) (0.02428) (0.02182) (0.02302) (0.02046) 
 
Observations 1290 1298 1276 1253 1229 1204 184 185 183 181 178 176 
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FIGURE 3: This table measures the total number of years that a country has spent in default 
per data in Reinhart’s database.  This graph helps visualize the severity and duration that a 




*Years in default is full duration of default and/or inability of a country to go back to the market/issue new 







Cummulative years in default zone





This graph shows the “growth to interest rate gap” between regions across time.  We can see 
that Latam countries although they also experience positive gaps, they also spend more time in 









Figure 5: Japan’s GDP -interest Rates Gap 
Japan for the most part has experienced a positive gap, consistent with Blanchard’s argument. 
This positive gap suggests Japan can continue issuing debt with zero fiscal cost due to their 







































































































































































Figure 6: Argentina’s GDP -Interest Rates Gap 
Argentina, like many countries that have defaulted in the Latam region have significant periods 
where their GDP-Interest Rate gap is negative, therefore increasing the government likelihood 































































































































Argentina's GDP-Interest Rate Gap 
 













Figure 9: Median Interest Rates Latin American 
 
 
